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Abstract
The paper sheds light on the importance of the international dimension for African economic
growth. While existing evidence points to a positive impact of openness on growth, the appropriate
dynamics of the implications are yet to be captured. The beneficial effects of exports are confirmed
for African economies, though available evidence suggests that it is the manufacturing component
that seems to really matter for growth. International shocks in the form of terms of trade declines;
economic instabilities of capital (investment) and imports; world interest rates; real exchange rate
misalignment; and external debt all appear to exercise adverse implications for growth in Africa.
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The African economic growth record has been uneven both intertemporally and cross-
nationally. For example, the mean annual GDP growth for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), excluding
South Africa, was 4.8 percent, 2.8 percent, 2.6 percent, and 2.0 percent for the periods: 1965-73,
1974-84, 1985-89, and 1990-96, respectively. Thus there has been a general downward trend in
growth over time, though more recent evidence shows a reversal of that trend since 1995, with an
average growth rate of 3.8 percent (World Bank data).  Cross-nationally, there is evidence of
greater differences among SSA than among non-African countries.
1 During the 1970s and 1980s,
for instance, we had in one extreme Botswana registering an average annual GDP growth rate of
over 10 percent, and several other SSA countries (Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, and Mauritius)
exhibiting growth of about 5 percent. In the other extreme, many countries stagnated with growth
rates of at most 1 percent (Chad, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, Zaire, and
Zambia). There have been similar cross-national disparities during the latter part of the 1980s and in
the 1990s.
Although domestic factors, both structural and policy, have been identified as explanatory
variables for the above inter-temporal and cross-country differences, external factors are likely to be
just as important. Indeed, Wheeler [1984] noted, with qualifications, that the role of "environmental
variables", consisting mostly of external forces, was more important than that of "policy" (domestic)
factors.
The present paper concentrates on reviewing the evidence on the role of the international
dimension in influencing African economic growth. How have such factors as openness,
trade/exports, international shocks, the real exchange rate, and external aid and debt affected
economic growth in Africa? Although numerous studies have analyzed the importance of these
variables for developing countries generally, the current paper focusses on the subset of those
studies that concentrate on African economies.2
I. Openness
 The extent to which economies may be affected by external factors will, of course, depend
on the degree of their openness, which is multi-faceted. Different measures of openness could
actually be contradictory. For example, export-promoting policies that subsidize exports may
enhance openness, and increase growth, by augmenting the size of the export sector. That same
policy, however, distorts international prices and thus reduces openness. Nevertheless, a recent
review study of openness concludes: "Open economies do grow more rapidly than closed
economies...whether the measure of openness has to do with exchange rate overvaluation, relative
price distortions, tariffs and quotas, share of trade in GDP, the black market premium, or a
composite measure combining some of these with state monopolization of commodity exports and
general socialism." (Easterly, 1998; p. 12)
Evidence on Africa regarding the role of openness is of two kinds. One group of studies,
which contain some elements of the role of openness but do not necessarily concentrate on it,
includes African countries as a sub-sample of the countries studied and assigns a dummy variable
"Africa" to reflect possible African idiosyncratic differences (Barro [1991], Levine and Renelt
[1992], DeLong and Summers [1992]). Several of these studies focus on African countries, however
(Sachs and Warner [1997], Easterly and Levine [1997], Temple [1998], Collier and Gunning
[1997]).
The other group of studies uses samples that comprise exclusively African economies.
Those with significant focus on openness include: Fosu [1990, 1992a], Gyimah-Brempong [1991],
Ghura and Grennes [1993], Lussier [1993], Assane and Pourgerami [1994], Ojo and Oshikoya
[1995], Ghura [1995], Savvides [1995], and Rodrik [1998].
Though the findings in the above studies regarding the importance of openness for Africa
differ somewhat, the overall result is that openness has a positive effect on growth in African
economies. For example, Sachs and Warner [1997] find the lack of openness as by far the largest
contributor to the dismal economic growth performance of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
The most comprehensive measure of openness appears to be the one used by Sachs and
Warner [1995]. An economy is deemed open to trade if it satisfies five tests: (1) average tariff rates
below 40 percent; (2) average quota and licensing coverage of imports of less than 40 percent; (3) a
black market exchange rate premium of less than 20 percent; (4) no extreme controls (taxes, quotas,
state monopolies) on exports; and (5) not considered a socialist country.3
Sachs and Warner [1997], hereafter S-W, define their openness variable as the proportion of
years within 1965-90 that an economy was open to international trade according to the above
criterion. On the basis of a sample of 77-79 developing (some developed) countries, of which 23
were SSA, S-W find that the 1965-90 average annual growth rate of GDP per capita was positively
associated with openness, and that the SSA dummy variable was insignificant. They further observe
that the openness variable generates the greatest impact among their baseline-model variables,
which account for approximately 90 percent of the variation in cross-country growth between 1965
and 1990. Table 1 presents the importance of these variables relative to openness. Note that S-W's
remaining variables exhibited insignificant coefficients: growth of neighboring countries, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, national saving ratio, and inflation.
*************Table 1 about here****************
S-W observe that openness to international trade affects growth via two channels: direct
impact on growth and the speed of convergence to steady state. "For the average country in the
sample, a switch from a closed regime to a completely open regime is estimated to raise the annual
growth rate by 2.21 percentage points." (p. 346)
The direct effect of African countries' pursuit of relatively closed policies was a reduction in
growth of .7 percentage points, compared to 1.4 percentage points if they had adopted the openness
policies of fast-growing East Asian countries (S-W [1998, table 5]). Hence, such fast-growing
openness policies would have resulted in a 2.1 percentage point increase via the direct impact.
Through its convergence-accelerating property (that is interaction with initial GDP per
economically active person), openness associated with the East Asian fast-growing openness would
additionally contribute a net increment of .3 percentage point to Africa's growth. Thus the total net
effect of East Asian-type openness would have been 2.4 percentage points, three times the .8
percent mean annual per capita GDP growth for SSA over the 1965-90 sample period.
It appears, therefore, that there is much to celebrate about the joys of openness even for
African economies. Nevertheless, as Easterly [1998] also argues, there are sorrows of openness as
well. Open economies are more likely to be vulnerable to terms-of-trade shocks and capital inflow
interruptions. It is further observed:4
"These risks can be substantial as dramatized by the recent Latin American financial
and currency crises, and even more recently by similar but relatively severe crises in
East Asia. Arguably, such risks could have been minimized by countries pursuing
the right policies to begin with. Nevertheless, the 'contagion' effect can be
substantial, and the 'speculative attacks' may lead to overshooting of the long-run
equilibrium exchange rates. Such short-run equilibria can be destabilizing and highly
deleterious to both economic and political institutions. It is thus conceivable that
these 'short-run' disturbances would have medium- or even long-term adverse
impacts on affected economies." Fosu [1998b, p. 31]
In addition, it may be worth noting that had the S-W 1965-1990 sample period been extended to the
more recent era when some of the deep sorrows of openness were felt in East Asia, the above S-W
optimistic message for African economies regarding openness might have been dampened
somewhat. It must also be stressed that within the framework of the endogenous growth theory, the
rate of convergence between African economies and high-performing countries is likely to be much
smaller than the one predicted under the standard neoclassical Solow-type model estimated by S-W.
In effect, there may be a relatively low rate of technological absorption by African countries
even under openness, unless there are sufficient structural changes in these economies. For example,
Hakura and Jaumotte [1998] find that technological absorption is much higher in cases where there
is production of a similar product being traded (intra-industry) than where trading is inter-industry.
In addition, deindustrialization is likely to accompany liberalization efforts that open up the
economy without a concomitant program to overcome structural impediments, such as low levels of
education and training, as well as poor physical and institutional infrastructure (e.g., Lall [1995]).
It needs also to be recognized that the cross-sectional study of the S-W type misses the
important dynamics likely to be characteristic of the role of openness. The fast growing East Asian
economies are much more open today than at their initial stages of development. "There is ample
evidence to anchor the view that these economies used, at some points in their initial pushes toward
development, interventionist policies that were hardly openness-enhancing." (Fosu [1998b, p. 33]
Indeed, some have argued that it was not so much the openness but capital accumulation
that led to these countries' rapid development (e.g., Rodrik [1997]). As these economies grew,
however, the need to open up became imperative, for new markets were required to overcome
bottlenecks in the economy. "The most recent example, and perhaps classic story, is likely to be that
of China. The evidence is clear that China did not achieve its recent and current economic successes
by pursuing open-market policies early on with the rest of the world. Indeed, the historical record is5
replete with many countries initially adopting relatively restrictive policies to sufficiently develop
their industrial structure before subsequently opening up." (Fosu [1998b, p. 33]).   There is also a
potential problem with S-W's openness variable: the proportion of years within the sample period
that an economy was considered open, as defined by an intersection of five test variables. For
example, a country that was closed initially, but attained a higher level of capital accumulation and
industrialization accompanied by growth (with or without much help from openness), and then
opened up subsequently for a relatively long period, might receive a high openness score. Yet, it is
quite possible that if that economy had opened up initially, according to the above openness
criterion, it might not have garnered the requisite capital accumulation and industrialization.  It is
thus a sequencing problem, which has not been well addressed in the literature. Hence, knowledge
of the optimal path of openness, currently lacking, is imperative.
Moreover, the relative potency of the test variables contained in the S-W's openness
criterion is unknown. For instance, many studies have uncovered the deleterious effect of currency
overvaluation. Might this be the major driving force or might it be some other variable?
Nor do we know the optimal level of openness. Is complete openness optimal? Hardly, for
fallacy of composition and externality issues abound (Fosu [1998b, p. 33]). In particular, can the
criteria levels established by S-W be considered optimal? Why not an average tariff threshold of 20
percent, for example, rather than the 40 percent specified by S-W?
The point here is that all we know is that those economies which were more open grew
more rapidly. We do not, however, know if these economies could have grown even faster had they
been more open, or if the optimal level is other than complete openness. Nor do we know the
optimal path of openness with respect to the level of development. From a policy implication
perspective, therefore, how far should we advise countries to open up, and should our advice differ
with the level of development, for example?
II.  Trade, Exports and Growth
Export Expansion and Openness
The rate of export growth may be viewed as a form of openness. Export growth need not be
synonymous with openness, however. On the one hand, a country with a large internal market may
not need to concentrate its efforts on the export market and may thus exhibit a low level of export6
expansion. Yet, such a country could have relatively low impediments to trade. Historically, the
U.S. is considered a good example of this case.
On the other hand, countries may subsidize exports and/or impose relatively high selective
tariffs on imports in order to protect certain industries, as in the case of several of the East Asian
countries. In this regard, export expansion may be large, yet there is evidence of closedness. In such
a case, therefore, the export promotion (EP) strategy may actually be backed by an amount of
import substitution (IS).
Hence, export expansion need not be synonymous with openness. Using the S-W criterion
of openness, for instance, one may classify an economy as not open where tariff rates are at least 40
percent, even though it may exhibit a high level of export expansion. On the other hand, countries
with high levels of non-tariff barriers could be classified as open according to this criterion,
regardless of its level of export expansion.
Theoretical Underpinnings and Econometric Specification
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The importance of exports for economic growth has been extensively discussed in the
literature (e.g., Feder [1982], Keesing [1967], and Emery [1967]; for a summary, see Edwards
[1993]). The positive implications of exports for growth include the following. First, export
development permits the home country to concentrate investment in those sectors where it enjoys a
comparative advantage. The resulting specialization is likely to augment overall productivity.
Second, the larger international market allows economies of scale to be realized in the export sector.
Third, worldwide competitive pressures are likely to lead to a reduction in inefficiencies in export
production and to result in the adoption of relatively efficient techniques in the traded-goods sector
overall. Finally, a larger export sector would make available more of the resources required to
import in a timely manner both physical and human capital, including advanced technologies in
production and management, and for training high quality labor. (Fosu [1990a])
The above theoretical arguments have led numerous authors to estimate an expanded
version of the standard production function, the "augmented aggregate production function" (Fosu
[1990a]):
(1) Q = Q[(L,K);X]7
where Q is real aggregate output; L and K denote, respectively, labor and capital inputs; and X is
exports. While X is not a proper argument  of the production function in that it is not a production
input in the neoclassical sense, it is intended to reflect international factors, enumerated above, that
may influence productivity but are not captured in L or K. Thus X may be viewed as a systematic
error term affecting Q, so that the conditional expectation E(X|L,K) is nonzero. Hence, estimates of
the impacts of L and K on Q may be biased or inconsistent unless the effects of X are controlled for.
(Fosu [1990a])
Differentiating equation (1) totally and rearranging terms, we have:
(2) Q' = eLL'+ eKK' + eXX'
where Q', L', K' and X' are the growth rates of Q, K, L and X  respectively, and eL, eK and eX are the
respective elasticities with respect to L, K and X. For estimation purposes, the modified version of
the above homogeneous equation (2) may be written as:
(3) Q' = b1 + b2L' + b3K'+ b4X'+ u
where b1 is the constant term to allow for possible nonhomogeneity of the function; bj (j=1, 2, 3) are
the respective labor, capital and exports coefficients to be estimated; and u is the stochastic
perturbation. Data availability leads to the final estimation equation:
(4) Q' = b1 + b2L' + b3'(I/Q) + b4X' + u'
where I is investment (dK), b3 the new capital coefficient, which represents the marginal product of
capital, u' the new error term, and the rest of the symbols are as previously defined.
Alternatively, based on a two-sector model, Feder [1983] has derived a version of equation
(4) as:
(5) Q' = a + bL' + c(I/Q) + hX'(X/Q) + v8
where a, b, c, and h are coefficients to be estimated, v the error term, and the rest of the symbols as
previously defined. In particular, h = [d/(1+d)+Fx] is the export impact, which consists of the
productivity differential between the export and nonexport sectors, d, and the externality effect on
the nonexport sector Fx. Furthermore, by specifying exports as a multiplicative argument of the
nonexport sector's production function, Feder derives an expanded function of the form:
(6) Q' = a + bL' + c(I/Q) + tX' + gX'(X/Q) + w
where t=Fx(X/N) measures the externality effect (X/N is the size  of the export relative to the
nonexport sector); g=d/(1+d)-t; w is the new error term; and the rest of the symbols are as already
defined above.
Empirical Evidence
Fosu [1990a] estimates equation (4) using 1960-70 and 1970-80 pooled data for a sample of
African countries and, for comparative purposes, for a sample of non-African developing countries.
He obtains a statistically significant coefficient of .12 for African economies, compared with that for
other developing countries of .15. These estimates are further observed to be statistically
indistinguishable. Thus it appears, as in the case of other developing economies, that African
countries would benefit about just as much from export expansion.
Lussier [1993] extends the sample period to 1990 using the above models and an alternative
specification based on the growth of relative share of exports (Helleiner [1986]). Lussier essentially
estimates three models: the "Fosu", "Helleiner", and "Feder" models. His results based on the
Helleiner specification suggest exports to be inconsequential for Africa. In contrast, the Fosu and
Feder models indicate a positive export impact similar to the estimate in Fosu [1990a]. Lussier
further finds that the additional term in the Feder model is inconsequential. That is, the estimate of g
in equation (6) was statistically insignificant and rather small in magnitude. Indeed, including this
term appears to lower the goodness of fit of the model. Lussier [1993, p. 117) concludes: "The
extended empirical investigation corroborates Fosu's conclusion regarding the positive contribution
of export growth to economic growth in African countries when panel data are employed."
Table 2 provides a summary of the findings from several studies on the impact of exports on
growth in Africa or SSA. It is clear from these results, at least, that the export effect is positive.9
More remarkably, the point estimate is stable around .1, regardless of the sample period or sample
composition. The export impact also seems to be invariant to whether the growth of GDP or its per
capita rate is used as the dependent variable.
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**************Table 2 about here*****************
The export effect estimate of .1 suggests that associated with a 10 percent increase in the
growth of merchandise exports, ceteris paribus, would be a rise of 1 percent GDP growth. While
this does not seem to be large, it must be noted that this estimate represents only the "externality
effect" and does not include marginal productivity differentials between the export and import
sectors (Feder [1983]). For example, the estimate of .1 for the export impact here implies an
additional productivity differential of 11 percent.
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Role of Export Composition
If manufacturing exports generate externality or productivity advantages over other forms of
exports, then the composition of exports should matter. For example, manufacturing would likely
involve greater learning-by-doing than primary exports, which could in turn be transmitted to the
nonexport sector: externality effect. Furthermore, international competition would prompt efficiency
improvements in the traded-goods sector, especially in manufacturing, leading to improved positive
marginal productivity differentials and positive externalities between the export and nonexport
sectors.
Some studies have revealed that incorporating manufacturing, rather than total, exports into
the augmented production function yields similar or better results in terms of goodness of fit of the
models estimated for developing economies (Tyler [1981], Balassa [1985]). Others have
additionally found that the export impact increases with the manufacturing share of exports (e.g.,
Fosu [1990b]), and that primary exports have little effect on the nonexport sector growth (Fosu
[1996b]).
Fosu [1991b] sheds some light on the implications of export composition for low-income,
versus middle-income, less developed countries (LDCs). Based on an analysis-of-covariance
specification, he finds "an additional positive impact of the manufacturing export sector of low-
income LDCs, notwithstanding their overall negative differential GDP growth." (p. 92)10
The above studies on the implications of export composition for economic growth suggest
that the finding of the non-trivial positive export effect for African economies might be driven in
great part by manufacturing, rather than total, exports in some of these countries. However, existing
studies do not isolate African countries. They suggest, nevertheless, that the relatively dismal
performance of African economies generally since the mid-1970s might be attributable in greater
part to their failure to diversify into manufacturing exports than to the deterioration in their primary
export performance.
This last observation appears to contradict the neoclassical notion that given Africa's relative
endowments in education and natural resources, the appropriate policy for economic growth is via
improving primary rather than manufacturing exports (see, e.g., Wood and Mayer [1998]). Taken
together, however, the above studies imply the desirability of pursuing policies that alter
endowments in order to achieve export diversification and concomitant economic growth.
Caveats
The foregoing discussion implies the importance of export promotion strategies as a way of
improving economic growth in Africa. Several studies have, however, questioned the reliability of
the empirical underpinnings for such a prescription. The first entails the potential problem of
endogeneity of exports. The White specification test applied by Fosu [1990a, pp. 833-834],
however, suggests that "the errors are independent of the regressors, and that the model is correctly
specified." In addition, based on the Hausman-Wu endogeneity test, Fosu [1996b, p. 473] finds that
"the null hypothesis that exports are exogenous cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance
level."
Second is the issue of causality. Do exports really promote growth, or is it the increase in
overall growth that improves competitiveness and thus promotes exports? The empirical evidence
on this question is rather mixed. For instance, using annual data for 37 countries, Jung and Marshall
[1985] perform "causality" tests and find that in 22 of the cases, it was impossible to establish the
direction of causation. In only four cases - Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, and Indonesia - do they
show the direction of causation as from exports to output.
By accounting for the phenomenon of declining marginal productivity differentials,
Hutchinson and Singh [1992], however, establish one-way causation from exports to output for a11
substantially larger number of countries (ten countries, versus three where output "causes" exports,
with 18 cases showing no evidence of causality either way).
Furthermore, as Kwan and Kwok [1995, pp. 1158-1159] have observed, "causality tests are
valid only for testing one component of 'strong' exogeneity" which, they argue, is a more relevant
test for the export-led growth theory. Applying the framework of Engle, Hendry, and Richard
[1983] to data on China, they find that exports are 'strongly exogenous' with respect to output and
that the results support the validity of the export-led growth hypothesis (p. 1165). Of course, this
finding is for China and the generalization of their result awaits its further application to other
economies.
The causality issue, therefore, remains unresolved, though the evidence appears to tilt in
favor of exports "causing" output. In any case, even in cases (the majority of them) where it is
difficult to establish a direction of causality either way, it is likely because output and exports may
move together as a result of some other exogenous factors. Such factors could include variables
such as capital accumulation (Rodrik [1997]), as in the case of East Asia), which may result from
fiscal and financial discipline as well as sound real exchange rate policies, or simply the undertaking
of generally competitiveness policies. These policies may be as equally good for output overall as
they are good for exports. Hence, exploring those factors that promote exports may also lead to
fostering growth generally. Hence, unless the uni-directional causation from output to exports is the
case, the issue of causality may not by itself be that important.
III. International Shocks
International shocks to domestic economies might originate from the real or financial sector.
One important variable reflecting conditions in the real sector is the international terms of trade
(TOT). Studies finding positive effects of TOT on African economic growth include: Deaton and
Miller [1996], Ghura [1995], Skinner [1987], and Wheeler [1984]. For example, in a model where a
large number of variables are controlled, including export growth and investment, Ghura [1995,
table 5] estimates the impact of the growth of TOT on per capita GDP growth in a 1970-90 annual
panel of 33 SSA countries as .059. This represents one-half of the export growth effect reported
therein. The estimate of the TOT impact also suggests that a 10 percent deterioration in TOT would
lead to per capita growth of about .6, which is not paltry especially when compared with the .3
percent average per capita GDP growth over the sample period. With TOT also falling by 2.312
percent over the same period, the effect of TOT deterioration is estimated at 45 percent of the per
capita GDP growth during the 1970-90 period. The "direct" impact of the terms of trade is thus
considerable.
In addition, Deaton and Miller [1996, table 13] estimate a contemporaneous elasticity of
output with respect to international commodity prices of .4, and a three-year cumulative lag
elasticity of about .6. They find further that the greatest impact of international commodity prices is
on investment (Deaton and Miller [table 5]).  Hence, terms of trade shocks have had significant
implications for growth in SSA, directly on output or indirectly through investment.
The role of world financial conditions may be represented by the world interest rate. Ghura
[1995], for example, observes a statistically negative effect of the real interest rate, measured as the
six-month Libor rate less the U.S. wholesale price inflation, on SSA per capita GDP growth. This
finding is not surprising, since increases in the world interest rate, relative to the domestic, may
encourage capital flight. In addition, higher interest rates are likely to increase the debt burden on
variable interest rate-denominated debt.
External Instabilities
Instabilities in African economies need not emanate from domestic origins only. For
example, fluctuations in export earnings may result in part from fluctuations in foreign demands or
in world prices.
5 These could have deleterious implications for economic growth of African
economies. The empirical evidence on this instability factor for Africa is mixed, however. For
example, on the one hand, Gyimah-Brempong [1991] observes a statistically negative impact of
export instability (EI) on GDP growth for SSA over 1960-86. On the other hand, Fosu [1992a]
estimates a statistically insignificant, though negative, effect of EI for both SSA and Africa during
1970-86. In contrast, he finds a substantially negative impact for non-African countries over the
same period.
Fosu [1991a] argues that EI is consequential for growth when it is transmitted into capital
(investment) instability (CI). There is no guarantee that such a transmission is automatic, however,
since "substantial portions of export proceeds may be channelled into consumption rather than
investment" (p. 82). Using a 1967-1986 cross-country sample of 33 SSA countries, he finds little
evidence in support of EI; however, he uncovers a substantial adverse impact of CI for SSA. From
these results (Fosu [1991a, table 3, p. 80]), we calculate the GDP growth elasticity with respect to13
CI, evaluated at the means, as .49. This compares with that of export growth and GDI/GDP of .27
and 1.1, respectively, similarly computed from the same table. Thus the adverse impact of CI is not
paltry.
Regarding the possible implications of fluctuations in imports for the African economic
growth process, Helleiner [1986] finds that import instability significantly reduced growth in Africa
during 1960-1979. Using 1967-1986 cross-country sample of SSA countries, Fosu [1998a]
corroborates the Helleiner result and further observes that import instability was an even greater
deterrent, than either EI or CI, for economic growth in SSA during 1967-1986.
Another possible channel for foreign-originating volatility for African economies might be
through export price instability (EPI). This form of economic fluctuations need not be correlated
with either EI or CI, though. Based on a 1967-86 cross-country sample of 31 SSA countries, for
example, Fosu [1997, p. 407] computes small zero-order correlation coefficients of EPI with respect
to EI and CI of only .192 and -.078, respectively. He also observes that EPI does not exert a
negative direct impact on GDP growth. Indeed, he estimates a positive, though insignificant, value
for the EPI coefficient. What remains to be explored, however, is whether there is an indirect effect
of EPI through exports or investment.
Although he does not provide direct evidence on African economies per se, Lutz [1994]
reports 1970-1988 panel-data results on terms of trade volatility for several subsamples of
developed and less developed countries (LDCs), including "low income" and "LDC primary
product exporters". He finds that for both of these subgroups, the coefficient of the net barter terms
of trade (NBTT) volatility was positive and, though that of income terms of trade (ITT) volatility
was negative, neither was significant.  He concludes: "The low-income countries and primary
exporters are the only subgroups for whom ITT fails to explain changes in output growth." (p. 1970)
These findings appear to support those for Africa and SSA reported in Fosu [1991b, 1992, 1997].
That is, it appears that for African economies, neither instability in exports nor in its price seems to
help explain the low growth experienced in many of these countries.
IV. The Real Exchange Rate
The optimal exchange rate policy in economic development seems to be now taking shape.
Although the appropriate foreign exchange regime (fixed versus floating) is still a subject of14
considerable contention, what is now emerging in the international/development literature is the
desirability of maintaining the exchange rate as close to equilibrium as possible.
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Ghura and Grennes [1993] present empirical evidence on the roles of real exchange rate
(RER) misalignment and volatility in macroeconomic performance in SSA. Using three different
measures of misalignment on 33 SSA countries over 1972-1987, they observe an adverse
relationship between per capita GDP growth and misalignment. They additionally report negative
effects on export and investment shares of GDP. Furthermore, including investment in the growth
equation reduced the magnitude of the misalignment coefficient only slightly while preserving its
statistical significance. Hence, the impact of the RER misalignment on output appears to be both
direct and indirect through investment. However, since exports are not controlled in any of their
growth equations, it is unclear regarding the extent to which the observed negative impact on
growth is attributable to the export channel.
Ghura and Grennes find further that fluctuations in RER have also been deleterious to the
growth process in SSA. Their RER volatility variable appears fragile in their growth equation,
however. Although its coefficient is significant in those growth models that exclude RER
misalignment, it becomes insignificant when the misalignment variable is entered into the equation.
In contrast, the coefficient of the RER volatility variable remains significant when misalignment is
included in the export and investment equations. This outcome suggests that the effect of RER
variability on growth is indirect, that is, through exports and investment.
V. External Aid/Debt
The evidence on the effectiveness of external aid on economic growth has been quite mixed.
On the one hand, several studies find that aid has been deleterious to the growth process ( e.g.,
Griffin and Enos [1970], Mosley et al. [1987], and Krueger et al. [1989]). On the other hand, others
have uncovered a positive effect of aid on growth (e.g., Grinols and Bhagwati [1976], Levy [1987],
Pack and Pack [1990]).  In a recent important contribution, Burnside and Dollar [1997] have argued
that it is the interaction with the policy environment that determines aid effectiveness. They find that
aid has been effective in good policy environment; however, aid by itself does not promote sound
policies. Thus, external aid applied selectively can pay dividends in economic growth in African
economies.15
The role of external debt in economic growth of SSA countries has been receiving some
attention recently. Generally, its effect has been observed to be deleterious to GDP growth (Ojo and
Oshikoya [1995], Elbadawi et al. [1996], Fosu [1996, 1999]). These studies use different measures
of the debt burden, however. Ojo and Oshikoya employ external debt outstanding as a proportion of
GNP in a per capita GDP growth model for 17 African countries over the 1970-1991 period; they
find a highly significant coefficient for their debt variable, suggesting the adverse effect of external
debt.
Elbadawi et al. [1996] use both the debt outstanding measure EDTGDP and the debt service
ratio as a proportion of exports DSX additionally in a per-capita-GDP growth model, estimated
cross-sectionally for 99 developing countries, including African countries. They find the DSX
coefficient to be significantly negative. They also observe the coefficients of EDTGNP and its
squared lagged term to be positive and negative, respectively. Overall, they find that "debt overhang
has retarded growth in sub-Saharan African countries." (p. 59)
Arguing that the debt burden is likely to affect economic growth via its impact on the
marginal product of capital, Fosu [1996] specifies external debt interactively with investment (as a
ratio of GNP) in a GDP growth equation. He estimates several cross-country models on data for 29
SSA countries over the 1970-1986 period, using various measures of the external debt burden based
on debt outstanding and debt service. Estimating both "continuous interactive models" (CIM) and
"discontinuous interactive models" (DIM), he reports significantly negative impacts of external debt
on average for all the debt measures used. The absolute elasticities at the sample means (on the basis
of CIM) range from .2 to .3 for the various debt measures (see table 3), with .33 considered the
"best" estimate based on the relative goodness of fit (GOF) of the models. Similarly, based on DIM,
he estimates that associated with "high indebtedness" was a reduction in growth of 25 percent to 52
percent, depending on the debt measure used, with 35 percent as the "best" estimate according to
GOF.
***************Table 3 about here****************
In addition, Fosu [1996a] observes that the GDP growth-external debt relationship is indeed
non-monotonic: "positive at low levels of investment and, after a GDI/GDP threshold of about 16
percent, it becomes negative." (p. 108) Using this threshold criterion, he observes that for the16
majority of SSA countries in the sample (20 out of the 29), external debt was adverse to growth, and
that "associated with a high-debt country is a fall in GDP growth of about 1 percentage point
annually...approximately one-third of the sample mean growth of GDP." (p. 108)
In a more recent study, Fosu [1999] estimates the impact of external debt on GDP growth in
the 1980s, based on a cross-country analysis of 35 SSA countries. He observes that "net external
debt", measured as total external debt outstanding less total reserves, as a proportion of GDP, is
probably the best measure of the debt burden. In an attempt to circumvent the potential problem of
causation, he uses the external debt measure for the first half of the period as well as that for the
entire period. He finds a partial elasticity of growth with respect to external debt of .5 for either
measure. He concludes that "SSA's growth could have averaged 1.2 percentage points, nearly 50
percent, higher during the decade of the 1980s" in the absence of the external debt burden. (p. 12)
VI. Conclusion   
The present review paper has attempted to shed light on the importance of the international
dimension for African economic growth. Although a large number of studies exist on this subject
for developing economies generally, we have concentrated our review on those that directly pertain
to African economies. Most of the selected studies are also sufficiently cross-country, rather than
country-specific, in order to permit some generalizations to be made.
The evidence seems to point to a positive impact of openness on growth in Africa. As we
have argued above, however, the appropriate dynamics of the implications of openness for growth
are yet to be captured. Without this, the question of how far a country must open up at a given level
of development remains open, notwithstanding the empirical finding that openness on average
promotes growth and substantially so.
There is a vast body of literature on the implications of exports for growth in developing
economies. It tends to support the view that higher GDP growth is associated with a larger rate of
export expansion. This view is supported for African economies as well. However, recent literature
points to the importance of export composition on the role of exports in the growth process. In
particular, developing countries with greater manufacturing export growth tend to grow faster.
Although the issue of causality between output and exports is far from decided, the overall result
seems to be that, in order to promote growth, African countries may need to engage in policies that
foster competitiveness especially in manufacturing exports.17
The paper has cited evidence bearing on the influence of international shocks on growth in
Africa. For example, increases/decreases in the growth in the external terms of trade would
increase/decrease GDP growth. This route could be direct, or indirect, that is, via investment.
The role of economic instabilities, presumably due to external forces, is a little more
complicated, however. The available evidence for Africa appears mixed for export instability (EI).
While EI per se does not appear to have been adverse to growth in SSA, it could be potentially
growth-inhibiting if EI were translated into capital (investment) instability (CI). Similarly, though
negative for developing economies generally, the effect of the volatility in the external terms of
trade does not seem evident for African economies. Existing evidence, however, seems to support
the view that import fluctuations are adverse to growth in SSA.
The rather little evidence currently available suggests that financial tightness in the
international financial markets matters for African economic growth. The evidence points to an
inverse relationship between SSA growth and world interest rates.
Virtually all studies on the impact of the real exchange rate (RER) on African economic
growth show RER misalignment to be adverse to growth, whether through its direct impact on
output or via its effects on investment or exports. The evidence on RER volatility is not as strong,
however. While on balance the results suggest a negative relationship between growth and RER
volatility, the impact appears indirect, that is, via exports and investment.
The available evidence on the role of external aid in growth is generally not isolated for
African economies. It suggests, however, that those countries with sound economic policies should
benefit from aid. What is unclear, though, is how to foster good policies, to begin with; after all, aid
by itself appears not to engender sound policies.
The role of external debt in growth seems rather complicated. First, the various measures of
the debt burden may have different implications for growth. Second, the growth-debt relationship
does not seem straightforward. For example, by making available additional resources to expand the
production set, debt may actually be growth enhancing. However, the reverse implication of debt
would occur if it negatively distorted resource allocation due to liquidity constraints or debt
overhang. The empirical evidence for African economies suggests that while a non-monotonic
growth-debt relationship is likely, external debt appears to have been adverse for the bulk of SSA
countries.18
Notes
1. Based on 1970-86 samples of 30 SSA and 38 non-African countries, respectively, Fosu [1992,
table 3] computes the coefficient of variation of GDP growth for SSA and non-Africa as 84.4
percent and 57.9 percent, respectively.
2. This section borrows generously from Fosu [1990a].
3. Of course, other studies not reported here may yield different estimates. For example, while the
above estimates are based on merchandise exports, other studies use "goods and nonfactor services"
for exports and obtain larger estimates for the export effect. Fosu [1991, table 3]), for instance,
reports an estimate of .3 using this more general category of exports for the 1967-1986 period.
4. That is, we solve the equation {d/(1+d)-.1)}=0, which assumes that the coefficient of the
additional term based on the Feder specification, g in equation (6), is zero. This assumption is
implicit in those restricted-form specifications that omit this additional term, as in Fosu [1990a], and
appears justified for the Africa/SSA sample as shown in estimates by Lussier [1993].
5. Of course, export fluctuations may also be supply-induced, which may have little to do with the
external sector.
6. See, for instance, Williamson [1997] for a discussion of this and related issues.19
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Table 1
Relative Impacts of Various Variables on Per Capita GDP Growth
*
Variable Relative Impact (%)
Openness 100.0
Life Expectancy                 77.8
Institutional Quality                              66.7
Central government saving                              66.7
Natural resource abundance                              55.5
Population growth (economically
 active relative to dependent)                                           44.4
Tropical climate                 44.4
Landlockedness    33.3
*Figures are expressed relative to the impact of openness, using calculations by Sachs and Warner
[1997] based on per unit changes in the respective standard deviations of the variables.25
Table 2
Export Impact on Economic Growth in Africa
Author(s)  Dep. var.  Samp. size  AF/SSA?  Estimate
*
[Table nos.]               [Period]  [No. ctrys.]
Fosu[1990a]              GDP Growth  56 [28]    AF         .12 (2.66)
 [ 1 ]              [1960-80]
Lussier[1993]              GDP Growth  57 [19]                  SSA         .10 (3.17)
 [A2(ii)]  [1960-90]
 [A4(ii)]  [1960-90]      72 [24]     AF         .11 (2.39)
Ojo and Oshi-              Per Capita
koya[1995]              GDP Growth  68 [17]                  AF         .09 (2.33)
 [ 2 ]              [1970-91]
Ghura[1995]               Per Capita
GDP Growth  578 [33]               SSA         .12 (5.05)
 [ 5 ]               [1970-90]
Note: The export impact is the coefficient of export growth. Where more than one model is
estimated, we report here the estimate based on the "best" model in terms of the goodness of fit. AF
is Africa, and SSA is sub-Saharan Africa.
*Absolute t ratio in parentheses.26
Table 3





DODY                             -.0194 [.267]  -1.03 [35.3]
DODR                             -.0059 [.330]  -.764 [24.7]
DSY                                 -.3464 [.336]  -1.29 [41.7]
DSR                                 -.0654 [.212]  -1.62 [52.4]
Source: Fosu [1996a]
a DODY is debt outstanding and disbursed as percent of GNP; DODR is defined similarly as
DODY, but expressed as a proportion of exports. DSY is debt service as percent of GNP; DSR is
similarly defined, but expressed as a proportion of exports.
b CIM is the "continuous interactive model". The non-bracketed figures are marginal effects, and the
bracketed values are partial elasticities computed at the sample means. The marginal effects are
calculated as b5 + b32k, where b5 is the coefficient of the continuous debt variable and b32 is the
coeffient of the debt variable interacted with the investment-GDP ratio, k; k is measured at the
sample mean. The growth of the labor force and k are controlled in the estimated regressions.
c DIM is the "discontinuous interactive model". The non-bracketed values are the estimated effects
of being classified as "highly indebted" (debt measure exceeding its respective sample mean value).
The bracketed values are the effects expressed as percent of the mean sample GDP growth rate.
They are computed as b2' + ck, where b2' is the coefficient of the discontinuous (dichotomous) debt
variable, and c is the coefficient of the debt variable interacted with the investment-GDP ratio, k; k
is measured at the sample mean. The growth of the labor force and k are controlled in the estimated
regressions.